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2Introduction 
This paper is an extract from a broader research which explores the regulatory 
role played by private actors in the environmental domain in Mexico. The overall 
research is actually focusing on the influence of foreign business actors over the 
regulatory capacity of the state in the context of developing countries where domestic 
institutions are relatively weak. However, this specific paper will only explain and 
analyse how the Mexican state calls on private actors to ensure higher level of 
compliance with domestic environmental regulations and what are the outcomes of 
such dynamics.
If voluntary environmental regulations have received some attention in the literature 
on environmental governance in recent years, research focused by large on developed 
countries (see Braitwaite and Drahos 2000, Lyon and Maxwell 2008, Nash and 
Ehrenfeld 1996, Rondinelli and Berry 2000). However, it is particularly in developing 
countries, where the state has little resources to ensure that business actors will 
comply with existing environmental regulations that voluntary regulations need to be 
assessed. In Mexico, the framework within which voluntary regulations take place is 
actually designed and shaped by the state but increasingly operated by private actors.
Change in environmental governance occurred as a result of broader transformations 
in the political economy of Mexico. This paper will proceed as follows: first, it will 
outline the theoretical background within which the paper has to be located. The 
following two sections will then show how institutionally – through its legal 
framework – and practically – through a specific initiative: the Clean Industry 
Program [el programa Industria Limpia] –, the Mexican state encourages and supports 
self-regulatory initiatives from economic actors in the environmental domain. Finally, 
the last section will review the consequences of this hybridization of environmental 
governance in Mexico
3Theoretical background
For the most part of the 20th century, the Mexican state has been highly 
interventionist, restricting foreign investment, nationalizing large companies and 
implementing protectionist policies1. Mexico committed to take coercive measures to 
address the negative externalities of its rapid industrialization after Stockholm 19722
as did many other countries. However, if the Mexican state was able to design and 
implement a specific economic model, it seemed unable to enforce the environmental 
laws and regulations it was developing at the domestic level over industrial actors. 
The control of the state over the industrial sector, directly – through state-owned 
enterprises – and indirectly – through industrial policies – sounds then inconsistent 
with the lack of enforcement of existing environmental regulations. 
In fact, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the Mexican government was clearly 
reluctant to penalize businesses which were ignoring environmental regulations. It 
was not exclusively because the state lacked the resources to control and fine these 
companies, but because it considered that complying with existing regulations would 
disadvantage domestic firms and therefore hinder national economic development 
(Gallagher 2004). On the one hand the state was establishing its first environmental 
regulatory framework and on the other hand it chose not to enforce environmental 
regulations to protect the interests of the Mexican industrial sector.
The liberalization of the Mexican economy since the early 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, post-NAFTA 3, increased the importance of freer markets in the Mexican 
political economy (Dussell Peters 2000) and therefore the influence of foreign 
economic actors. Such a tremendous change in the Mexican political economy has 
had repercussions over the state’s strategy to protect and preserve the natural 
environment. In terms of environmental regulations, this evolution materialized in that 
                                               
1 This economic model, known as Import-Substitution Industrialization, was developed by economists 
such as R. Prebish, H. Singer and C. Furtado, it represented an alternative to the Free Trade agenda and 
has been embraced by a number of developing countries in Latin America (and to some extent in Asia 
and Africa) from the 1930s to the 1980s
2 Stockholm 1972: UN Conference on the Human Environment: UN's first major conference on 
international environmental issues, and marked a turning point in the development of international 
environmental politics
3 The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed and ratified in 1994 between Mexico, the 
United States and Canada
4the state went from a command-and-control approach to a more inclusive strategy, 
inviting business actors, domestic and foreign, to participate in establishing regulatory 
mechanisms4 . At the same time, it is the Mexican state which actively pursued 
economic liberalization. However, as noted by Ross Schneider (2009: 555), it does 
not mean that the form of capitalism which has been developing in Latin America 
since then – and this includes Mexico – can be qualified as “state-led” or “market-led” 
but in fact, it is a form of “business-led” development. The business sector has grown 
in terms of its political influence and its material power; within this category, foreign 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) occupy a special place in Mexico. 
Foreign investment has always been present in Mexico in one form or another but this 
phenomenon became more visible in the second half of the 1990s through the 
presence of many large MNCs – subsidiaries, branches, affiliates – mostly from the 
United States. Materially, these foreign firms, in particular in the manufacturing 
sector, play an important role in the Mexican economy because they represent 
investments, jobs, and revenues for the state (Pacheco-López 2005: 1157). The 
Mexican economy grew increasingly dependent on these organizations which occupy 
leading positions in a number of key industrial activities such as car manufacturing, 
food and beverage, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, etc (Dussel Peters 2000). Foreign 
MNCs have therefore gained some form of material power over the Mexican state. 
Regarding environmental politics, these firms have also increased their discursive 
power as concepts such as sustainable development or corporate social responsibility 
have progressively gained momentum in Mexico with the help of business-driven 
organizations and policy-oriented think-tanks. The Mexican Centre for Philanthropy 
(CEMEFI: Centro Mexicano de Filantropía) includes most large businesses in Mexico, 
foreign and domestic, and is a good and illustration of such a trend. The Mexican 
chapter of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (CESPEDES) is 
another forum which strongly promotes mechanisms of self-regulation for industry 
and opposes traditional state policies imposed on businesses. Corporate environmental 
voluntary regulations are now taken seriously by the Mexican state which is willing to 
                                               
4 The broader research established a parallel between the liberalization of the Mexican economy and 
evolution of the environmental legal framework 
5engage with these firms on these topics still at the same time defined primarily by the 
MNCs.
Foreign firms are present in industry associations, chambers of commerce, and any 
instances at the domestic level which play the role of political forum where private 
actors can express their interests and be consulted by the government. Along with 
opening up its economy to foreign investment, the state has also increasingly included 
business actors, such as industry associations, in its environmental regulatory 
endeavour and therefore provided foreign MNCs with the possibility to express their 
vision of how to tackle environmental issues. In other words, although they have ways 
to directly use their power, foreign MNCs do not have to oppose frontally the 
Mexican state. They use existing institutions to modify the dominant approach to 
environmental regulations and reframe environmental issues along lines which are 
non-threatening to their economic activities. In doing so, and because they participate 
in some aspects of the policy-making process in the environmental arena, they are 
able to convince the state that the realization of their interests, coupled with their 
environmental commitments, carry benefits for the state and for society and should 
therefore be protected and enhanced.
The environmental self-regulatory endeavour of foreign MNCs is a source and an 
expression of private authority in the political economy of Mexico. Theoretically, the 
environmental realm is an interesting arena to understand the ways in which foreign 
MNCS create and use power but also how the state manoeuvres and uses the private 
sector to try to achieve goals that it would otherwise not achieve. If little study has 
been conducted on voluntary regulations in developing countries, emerging research
(Blackman et al. 2007) indicates that they do not play the same role than in 
industrialized states. In the latter case, enforcement of existing regulations and the 
institutional arrangements in place ensure that in general, compliance is not an issue. 
Self-regulations mainly exist to push firms to go beyond existing regulations (Lyon 
and Maxwell 2002). However, in developing countries, monitoring, control, and 
enforcement of existing regulations is problematic and self-regulations therefore may 
be a tool to ensure that firms will comply with existing norms and rules (Blackman et 
al. 2007), as the Mexican case suggests. The next section will review the legal context 
6through which the Mexican state is actively supporting the self-regulatory approach 
favoured by foreign MNCs.
The meaning of Article 38
In 1988, the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental 
Protection (LGEEPA) was passed. It was Mexico’s first comprehensive 
environmental law. The Law addresses a broad range of environmental matters such 
as protection of natural areas, exploitation of natural elements including land and 
water, and protection of the environment, including atmospheric contamination, water 
and soil contamination, hazardous activities and waste, nuclear energy and other 
forms of pollution. LGEEPA also sets forth control and safety measures, penalties for 
non compliance, guidelines for environmental impact statements and risk assessments
(Gilbreath 2003). LGEEPA indeed defines the framework for all environmental laws 
and regulations in Mexico. 
In 1996, the Law was amended and changed its stated purpose to include for instance
the concept of sustainable development. The new added elements established amongst 
other things the sustainable use, preservation and remediation of soils, water and other 
natural resources in ways that make the obtaining of economic  benefits and activities 
of society compatible with the preservation of the ecosystem. Economic 
considerations became then clearly visible in the Law (see Section 3, Article 21, 22, 
22BIS and 23 of LGEEPA). It also created the establishment of mechanisms for 
coordination, inducement and cooperation among authorities, the public and private 
sector (LGEEPA, Article 1(ix)). This amendment occurred in the post-NAFTA era 
and reflects the changing Mexican political economy resulting from economic 
liberalisation. Market mechanisms and voluntary regulations then became the 
preferred way to address environmental issues as it reflected the broader neo-liberal
agenda embedded in NAFTA and imposed on Mexico.
When the Law emphasizes the participation of the “private sector” and of “persons”
(LGEEPA, Article 1(vii)), it actually invites MNCs to participate actively in the 
implementation of the law and in the design of any further regulations flowing from it. 
7The amendment makes the Law closer to adopting market-based solutions to 
environmental problems in Mexico by giving more room for action to economic 
actors and is therefore consistent with the kind of environmental ideology found in 
NAFTA.
One article of LGEEPA is of particular interest as it shows the willingness of the 
Mexican state to concretely rely on economic actors to increase levels of compliance 
with LGEEPA: it is Article 38.The text of the article clearly establishes the role that 
the Mexican legislator would like corporations to play. It starts by saying that:
Producers, businesses or business organizations are entitled to develop 
voluntary processes of environmental self-regulation, through which they will 
improve their environmental performance, while respecting the legislation and 
regulatory framework and they will commit to surpass or to comply at greater 
levels, objectives and benefits in terms of environmental protection (author’s 
translation)
This is an acknowledgement that environmental policies and regulations emanating 
from the Mexican state are not the only option available to address environmental 
issues. The state establishes through Article 38 that private, business-oriented 
organizations are valid and legitimate actors to act on environmental problems. This
introduction of the Article stipulates that businesses are entitled to develop their own 
environmental standards and norms as long as they respect the existing environmental 
regulatory framework. This means that extra norms and standards regarding pollution, 
designed and implemented by private actors, outside of any formal state supervision,
may be considered as suitable.
Given the particular political economy of Mexico, through this legislation, the 
Mexican state is actually confirming and formalizing the political power of economic 
entities such as large foreign firms and enhancing their private authority. It is 
predictable that only the largest and most powerful companies will dedicate the time 
and resources necessary to develop and implement their own environmental norms 
and standards. In the Mexican context, these firms are foreign MNCs and in majority
coming from the United States. Large Mexican businesses are often only starting to 
8develop a Corporate Social Responsibility dimension to their business identity. 
Foreign firms on the contrary benefit from almost twenty years of self-regulatory 
endeavours. In addition, the overwhelming majority of Mexican businesses are small 
or medium enterprise with little resources and no experience in environmental 
voluntary regulations. Article 38 is therefore important because it is expanding the 
sphere of influence of specific entities: foreign corporate actors. These foreign firms 
through their self-regulatory endeavours will be in a position of pulling their business 
partners to follow the norms they enacted independently of state regulations and they 
will have the back-up of a legal article to do so. Such process indicates that private 
and public authority are intertwined in the decision-making and enforcement aspect of 
environmental regulations.
Further, Article 38(ii) states that: 
The Secretary [for the environment] at the federal level will induce or will 
arrange:  
The compliance with voluntary norms or technical specifications in 
environmental matter that will be stricter than the Mexican official norms or 
that refer to aspects not planned by those, which will be established through the 
consent of the individuals or associations or organizations that represent them.  
For such effect, the Secretary will be able to promote the establishment of 
Mexican norms according to the process which applies in the Federal law on 
Metrology and Normalization (author’s translation)
This section of the article is more explicit concerning the outcome of such dynamics. 
It suggests that the federal Secretary for the Environment (SEMARNAT) will be able 
to transform voluntary norms or standards into formal regulations and ensure that 
other business actors adhere to them too. The Secretary will then make use of the Law 
on Metrology and Normalization to let these industry-led regulations become official 
Mexican environmental norms. 
This second aspect of Article 38 and its paragraph (ii) reveals further how the
Mexican state plans to use regulations designed and implemented by private 
economic entities as draft norms. When an industry or a group of producers or 
9industries creates specific environmental standards and regulations, the state is then 
willing to incorporate these norms into its regulatory framework. This means that to 
an extent, it is business – not any kind of business though, foreign [American] MNCs 
in majority – which is in charge of creating environmental regulations that the state 
will then validate. If article 38 legitimizes the regulatory power of firms and industries 
by inviting them to issue environmental standards and norms, it also allows them to 
get involved in establishing the parameters of the environmental agenda through 
inscribing these new rules into the Mexican legal system.
Finally, Article 38 BIS operationalises how the voluntary commitment of firms to 
environmental regulations will take place. It creates the institutional infrastructure 
necessary for this enterprise:
The responsible for the operation of a business will be able in a voluntary 
manner, through an environmental audit, to carry out the methodological exam 
of their operations, regarding the pollution and risk that they generate, as well 
as their degree of compliance with the environmental regulatory framework and 
with the international parameters of good practices with the purpose to define 
the necessary corrective and preventive measures to protect the environment 
(author’s translation).
Through Article 38, the state did not only include private economic actors as potential 
designers of environmental norms in its legal framework, it also created the space to 
concretely allow further implication from the business sector in enhancing levels of 
compliance with existing environmental regulations. Within the LGEEPA, Article 38 
validates the approach that private actors will be relied on by the state to maximize 
the efficiency of existing regulations. In fact, the National Environmental Auditing 
Program[Programa Nacional de Auditoria Ambiental (PNAA)], commonly called the 
Clean Industry Program, comes out of this legal possibility given to businesses to self-
regulate and will be further explained in the next part.
This section showed that the Mexican state recognized the voluntary environmental 
regulatory endeavours of businesses, and agreed on assisting these private actors in 
their initiatives through including them as potential “regulators” in its legal 
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framework. Implicitly, the state is relying mostly upon foreign MNCS to play this role 
though considering that they are the most environmentally aware private actors in 
Mexico due to their institutional background and global production model. Not only 
does the Mexican state inscribe in its legal framework the regulatory role that private 
actors can play, but it also creates institutional mechanisms to facilitate this evolution. 
The next section will now explore what these mechanisms are and look at the Clean 
Industry Program to understand how the private authority of foreign MNCS is 
consolidated through this state-led but corporate-driven initiative.
The Clean Industry program
If the Mexican state has included in its legal framework the possibility for 
companies to self-regulate, it created as well more practical mechanisms to assist 
firms in their self-regulatory endeavour. The Clean Industry program reflects how the 
state is not only counting on foreign companies to become models of compliance with 
environmental regulations, but it also delegates to them part of the responsibility to 
ensure that smaller firms are complying with existing legislations. At the same time, 
this process illustrates how foreign firms are able to use this program to advance their 
own environmental agenda. 
The liberalization of the Mexican economy from the early 1990s onward changed 
drastically the economic model adopted by Mexico. Compliance with environmental 
laws and regulations became an area of scrutiny not only at the domestic level but 
also internationally, especially in the context of the negotiations and ratification of 
NAFTA. The creation of the Clean Industry program in Mexico in 1997 came from 
the realization that in Mexico, public and private business actors were not following 
environmental norms and were disregarding the various existing environmental 
regulations and legislations. 
The program represents indeed a clever political manoeuvre for the Mexican state to 
buy time in terms of evaluating its environmental commitments post-NAFTA and to 
avoid to close or at least to heavily fine more than 95% of private and publicly-owned 
Mexican firms. As explained earlier, Mexican businesses were not complying with 
11
the regulations, and the government was not either coercing them to do so or 
punishing them for ignoring them. The opening of the Mexican economy and the 
ratification of NAFTA however forced the state to ensure a satisfying level of 
compliance with environmental regulations. 
The Clean Industry program is run by the PROFEPA [la Procuraduría Federal de 
Protección al Ambiente]. The PROFEPA is an organ of the state in charge to promote 
the establishment and the control of environmental norms, regulations, laws, technical 
criteria to improve the quality of the natural environment and to receive complaints 
about entities in breach of existing environmental laws and regulations (PROFEPA 
website). In 1992, the PROFEPA launched the National Environmental Auditing 
Program. In 1997, the first Clean Industry certificates were issued to businesses that 
voluntarily invested and fixed the environmental irregularities detected during the 
audit. In fact, early in the 1990s, the United States implemented a few programs –
Green Lights, WasteWise, and 33/50 for instance (Videras and Alberini 2000) – based 
on a similar dynamics. Mexico seems to have imported from the United States certain 
institutional mechanisms to increase the degree of compliance of industrial actors. 
The concept of environmental audit is understood as a participatory, voluntary 
mechanism which involves an evaluation of the environmental results of particular 
industries and firms in terms of their environmental records and levels of compliance.
The program includes a detailed technical evaluation of regulated aspects of industrial 
activities such as control of sewage, air pollution, dangerous residues and noise. It is 
not only a corrective mechanism but also a preventive one as it considers aspects 
which are not yet regulated like the design of the installations, the processes of 
production, the maintenance of infrastructure, the training of the personnel, etc. Plants 
volunteering to join the program pay for an environmental audit by an accredited 
third-party, private sector inspector (PROFEPA website). Companies are responsible 
for financing the auditor, selecting technical specialists of the sector; they also have 
the responsibility for providing the auditor with the necessary material support for the 
elaboration of the environmental audits, such as equipment for analysis, computation 
and all necessary supports to conduct the audit. All these costs are the sole 
responsibility of the company.
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When the plant agrees to correct all violations to existing environmental norms and 
regulations, the state, in return, agrees not to penalize it during the time deemed 
necessary to fix these violations (Blackman 2008). Once that date has passed and if 
the firm is now complying with existing regulations or go beyond them, the state 
delivers the “Clean Industry” certificate and the plant will not be controlled for an 
agreed period of time (usually 2 years).
The preventive aspect of the program is where foreign firms have some latitude to act 
and push for norms, standards and self-regulations which would reflect their own 
identity and their understanding of their environmental duties and responsibilities. It 
gives them a window to influence further regulations in these areas. As it has been 
mentioned earlier, when the norms and standards established are judged satisfactory 
as a result of the auditing process, the state can validate them trough the Law on 
Metrology and Normalization and transform them into Official Mexican Norms. This 
suggests that private foreign actors shape environmental norms and the state 
legitimizes them. The hybrid nature of the environmental regulatory framework in 
Mexico is then visible.
Only a few recent studies measure the effectiveness of the Mexican PNAA (see 
Blackman et al 2007, Foster and Gutierrez 2009, Gallagher and Zarsky 2007) but 
these are partial results. However, if more recent data are rare, it seems that already in 
2000, 1,614 installations, which represented more than 70% of the GDP of Mexico, 
were part of the program (SEMARNAT 2008). 1,085 plans for action were signed, 
including all the installations from the para-state sector and the major big private 
groups, foreign and domestic. Some information released by the National Institute for 
Ecology (INE) suggests that the Clean Industry program has had positive results. 
From 1995 to 2000, atmospheric emission from the participating firms decreased by 
22.5%, the release of residual waters decreased by 41.2% and the Bio-chemical 
demand for Oxygen decreased by 15.76%.
More broadly, from 1997 until 2009, more than 7,000 plants have entered the program 
(Graph 1) and more than 2,700 firms received the Clean Industry certification (Foster 
et al. 2009, Alvarez-Larrauri and Fogel 2008). Large domestic firms and foreign 
MNCs are the most represented but increasingly, middle-size companies are joining 
13
the Clean Industry program as well. Participating firms, particularly foreign MNCs 
tend to enter the program and then require their business partners to participate in the 








































Overall, it seems that the program has economic advantages for the participating firms. 
Between 1995 and 2000, the INE reports that 70% of the firms surveyed confirmed
important economic benefits, an estimated 283 million de pesos and the ones which 
detailed the kind of saving they were able to make did it along the following lines: 
insurance premium costs went down 60%, energy consumption efficiency saved them 
22% of their regular energy bill, and they decrease their payment on water use and 
water pollution by 14.5%. At the same time they declared that these actions have 
favoured financial gain resulting from the implicit savings that are generated upon 
establishing plans, programs and procedures for the recycling, optimal use of supplies, 
by-products, residues and economic, natural, and human resources.
At the international level, the Clean Industry program has received a number of 
official recognitions. In the US, at the time of the first presidential report regarding 
the results of NAFTA, the then president Clinton stated that the Clean Industry was an 
innovative and successful program which was progressively ensuring the compliance 
of all businesses in Mexico to environmental norms and regulations (REF). In fact, a 
parallel agreement to NAFTA, the North America Cooperation Agreement, 
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established in its article V, that the Mexican environmental audit program was a form 
of compliance with the environmental legislation in Mexico as defined in the treaty. 
This also resulted in an incentive for the exporting sector to enter the National 
Program for Environmental Audit. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), of which Mexico is a member since 1994, acknowledged in its 
1998 report on the environmental situation in Mexico that the Clean Industry program 
has allowed serious improvements in terms of environmental protection.  In the rest of 
the Latin American continent, a number of workshops and training sessions have been 
organized to publicize the mechanisms and results of the Clean Industry program. In 
fact, the path chosen by the Mexican state to develop mechanisms of environmental 
governance was validated by all the economic actors, institutional and private, as it 
was considered as a way to reconcile economic growth and environmental 
considerations and at the same time to minimize the involvement of the state.
Meaning and consequences of the Mexican hybrid environmental regulatory 
mechanisms
The Clean Industry program shows how in the Mexican context, the state 
relies on private actors and their voluntary commitments to increase the level of 
compliance with existing environmental regulations. It represents an alternative to 
traditional control and enforcement mechanisms and a concrete illustration of state 
and private authority being combined to achieve specific outcomes. If the state has 
established the institutional framework through which self-regulation can take place, 
they are the firms, and in particular foreign MNCS, that indeed drive this initiative. In 
fact the head of the auditing department of the PROFEPA confirmed that foreign 
firms were the most represented and that their environmental records were better than 
national companies5. The interviewee also indicated that attracting foreign MNCs into 
the program was one of the goals of the PROFEPA because of the “pull” effect that it 
represented on other businesses.
                                               
5 Interviewed on 20th February 2010, PROFEPA, Mexico City
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Viewed from the state, the Mexican environmental audit is a procedure that combines 
the advantages of private certification with those of the oversight from governmental 
authorities. On the one hand, the elaboration of the audit itself is realized by private 
consultants with businesses internalizing the cost of the audit and at the same time, 
business are responsible towards governmental authorities which emits the Clean 
Industry Certificate. The state therefore does not have to use its resources to measure 
the level of non-compliance and once a Clean Industry certificate is issued, the state 
does not have to control the firm and this represents another source of savings. In the 
context of a country with little resources available to monitor and enforce the Law, 
this mechanism is perceived by the Mexican state as a successful alternative to 
traditional form of governance.
For foreign MNCs, the Clean Industry Program has also a number of advantages
beyond the ones already mentioned. It enables their products to be sold in global or 
regional markets as they carry a label validated by the Mexican state regarding the 
respect of environmental norms and standards in their processes of production. When 
most environmental labelling is operated by private organizations, it is a comparative 
advantage to display a label backed-up by the state. At the same time, the cost to 
participate is relatively low because these foreign firms already comply with existing 
Mexican regulations due to their national origins, global production standards and to 
their commitment to appear as champions of sustainable development for marketing 
purposes. 
The program also enables these foreign firms to enhance their authority over domestic 
small and medium Mexican firms and to also increase their political power. If the 
Mexican state seems unable to coerce these small and medium businesses and does 
not have the financial resources to conduct thorough controls over them, foreign 
MNCs can play this role and they are encouraged to do so. The firms from the case 
studies interviewed for the broader research confirmed that they were increasingly 
requiring their business partners to enter the Clean Industry Program to remain 
commercial interlocutors. This suggests that, through pushing Mexican businesses to 
voluntary commit to follow environmental regulations, foreign MNCs gain power 
over them as it becomes an argument they can use in their commercial negotiations. 
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At the same time, the Mexican state also realizes that it can ensure much higher levels 
of compliance through the informal partnership happening within the Clean Industry 
program than on its own. 
This last point matters because it grants foreign MNCs with a new form of power that 
might be qualified as “self-regulatory capture”. As explained earlier, the Clean 
Industry program does not only aim at correcting processes of production but it also 
has a preventive dimension. Firms which already comply with environmental 
regulations, as it is the case with most foreign MNCs, can influence further state 
norms and regulations through the extra norms and standards they have established 
and intent to spread. The call for self-regulations from the state is echoed by the 
foreign firms but on their own terms. With the possibility of validating corporate-led 
norms and standards established by the private sector through the Law of Metrology 
and Normalization, foreign firms can dictate the shape of future formal norms 
applicable to other economic actors. This means that the source of environmental 
regulations is to be found in the private sector, dominated by foreign actors, more than 
in the public sector although the legitimizing role of the latter is still needed.
At the societal level, the fact that foreign MNCs, legally and ideologically responsible 
first and foremost to their shareholders, became increasingly involved in setting-up 
the environmental agenda and in so doing shaping the normative aspects of the 
ecological crisis is highly problematic. If it has been argued that this process weakens 
the autonomy and independence of the Mexican state to regulate, it also affects the 
democratic dynamic in Mexico. In spite of a chaotic Mexican political sphere, 
national and local governments are accountable to the Mexican society which is 
entitled to validate or dismiss their actions through the voting process. The political 
power gained by foreign firms is outside of this democratic process. MNCs are not 
accountable or responsible to the Mexican society but to their headquarters and 
shareholders. The transfer from a public to private form of environmental governance 
is therefore accompanied by the confiscation of the possibility for citizens to express 
their satisfaction or disagreement with the outcomes of such a new model of 
environmental governance.
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With the advent of private environmental governance, the Mexican society is even 
more subjugated to the power of foreign economic actors. In terms of authoritative 
decisions, the reach of these profit-driven entities spread to non-economic aspects of 
society. Not only MNCs have increasing material power over the Mexican society 
because they are sources of employment and they provide the goods and services 
available to society, but they also progressively determine the way in which the 
natural environment ought to be preserved and protected. The consequence of the 
shift from government to governance in the Mexican context is the weakening of the 
autonomy of the Mexican society to decide on non-economic factors affecting social 
life. At the same time it increases the concentration of power in the hands of 
economic entities with interests and preferences dictated by the profit motive and with 
the authority to decide to an extent of the environmental agenda.
Conclusion 
This paper has explained and analysed an instance of environmental 
governance in which both public and private forms of authority get involved. This 
model represents an evolution of the design, implementation and control of regulatory 
mechanisms in environmental governance. It is particularly in developing countries 
that such a model can flourish as it builds on the inability of traditional institutional 
actors to play their regulatory and enforcement role. However, this phenomenon 
occurs through a legal framework originating from the state and which provides the 
institutional infrastructure necessary for private actors such as foreign MNCs to push 
for their (self-) regulatory agenda. At the same time, the pragmatism of the Mexican 
state has problematic consequences for its own capacity to further regulate these 
actors autonomously. Most importantly, it affects the Mexican society which is faced 
with a system of governance, in the environmental realm, over which it has no control
or possibility to participate, and dominated by actors with who it cannot engage.
The broader research within which this paper fits looks in details into the kind of self-
regulations promoted by foreign MNCs based on the institutional dynamics playing 
out in the states they originate from. Empirical data show that if they publicize their 
voluntary commitments and to an extent act on these commitments, they also select 
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the environmental issues which they can address without threatening their quest for 
profits. When structural changes are needed to tackle the ecological crisis that Mexico 
is facing, foreign MNCS will only modify aspects of their business model which will 
in fact potentially enhance their economic growth. Beside a visible contradiction 
between environmental well-being and productive activities in the current global 
political economy, there is therefore only a relative short-term positive impact coming 
out of the hybridization of environmental governance in Mexico and they do not 
weight favourably compared to the problematic consequences of such an evolution of 
environmental regulatory dynamics for the Mexican state and for the Mexican society.
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